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L-J, INC. V. BITUMINOUS FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE CO.:
IN DETERMINING COVERAGE UNDER COMMERCIAL
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICIES, SHOULD POLICY
LANGUAGE OR PUBLIC POLICY CONTROL?
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2004, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued a decision that will
have a serious impact on the construction industry and construction law
practitioners in South Carolina. In L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.,' the South Carolina Supreme Court held Bituminous was not responsible for
covering a contractor's faulty workmanship.2 The court failed to reach the
underlying issues of policy exclusions and exceptions, and instead ruled faulty
workmanship does not rise to the level of an "occurrence" under a commercial
general liability policy This decision affects the way construction lawyers
practice in South Carolina and limits the abilities of injured consumers to recover
for damaged property. By analyzing the Bituminous facts on a public policy basis
rather than by analyzing the language of the insurance policy at issue, the supreme
court not only limited the rights for recovery in construction law defect cases in
South Carolina, but also opened the door for many coverage questions under
general liability policies.
This Note focuses on the impact of Bituminous, its effects on South Carolina
construction law and policy, and the changes attorneys should expect in
construction law litigation in the decision's aftermath. Part I provides a summary
of the supreme court's decision, as well as the case's procedural history. Part I
examines the history of commercial general liability policies and changes made to
policy forms over the years. Part HI first analyzes the supreme court's decision by
comparison to the South Carolina Court of Appeals' examination of this issue, and
then considers the effects of policy language and public policy in this case and
other construction defect cases. Part IV concludes this Note by exploring the
impact Bituminous will have on construction law disputes in the future.
II. THE DECISION
A. Facts
Contractor L-J, Inc. (Contractor) began construction of a roadway for the
Dunes West Joint Venture (Developer) in 1989 and completed the project in 1990.'
By 1994 the roadway had deteriorated to such a point that the Developer brought
suit against the Contractor for breach of warranty, breach of contract, and
1. No. 25854, 2004 S.C. LEXIS 190 (S.C. Aug. 9, 2004).
2. Id. at *9.
3. Id. at *6-7.
4. Id. at "2.
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negligence.' Experts attributed the damage to faulty preparation of the subgrade
(including failure to remove tree stumps and to compact the soft clay sufficiently),
a road course that was too thin, excessive traffic, and an improper drainage system.
6
Several insurers provided commercial general liability (CGL) coverage for the
project, including Bituminous, whose policy period began in 1990 and ended in
1992.7
B. Procedural History
After the Contractor and Developer settled out of court for $750,000, the
Contractor sought indemnification from the insurers covering the projectS Three
of the insurers agreed to indemnify the Contractor in the amount of $362,500, but
Bituminous refused to cover the claim. The Contractor and the three former
insurers then brought a declaratory judgment action against Bituminous, seeking
contribution for part of the settlement amount and indemnification for defense
costs.'
The circuit court referred the declaratory judgment action to a special master,
who determined "the damage to the roadway system was covered under the
Bituminous policy."" In addition, the master found that the damage to the roadway
did in fact constitute an "occurrence" under the policy; the "expected or intended"
consequences and "your work" exclusions did not exclude Bituminous from
coverage because a subcontractor performed the work on the Contractor's behalf.'2
The master ordered Bituminous to pay $103,571.42 to the other carriers.'3
Bituminous appealed on the grounds that no "occurrence" had arisen according
to the meaning of the policy, and even if an occurrence had taken place, it did not
trigger the policy exclusions.'4 Affirming the master's decision, the court of
appeals found not only the existence of an occurrence under the policy, but also that
"the products-completed operations hazard and subcontractor exception provisions
restore coverage that would otherwise have been excluded by the 'your work'
provision."'"
5. Id.
6. Id. at *5.
7. L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 25854,2004 S.C. LEXIS 190, at *2-3 (S.C.
Aug. 9, 2004).





13. L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 25854,2004 S.C. LEXIS 190, at *4 (S.C.
Aug. 9,2004).
14. Id
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C. The Supreme Court's Holding and Reasoning
As its first issue, the supreme court addressed the definition of an "occurrence"
under the CGL policy and whether or not the deterioration of the roadway in this
case constituted such an "occurrence." 6 The court agreed with Bituminous that the
"court of appeals erred in determining that the property damage resulting from the
faulty grading and construction of the roads at Dunes West constituted an
'occurrence' under its CGL policy with the Contractor."' 7 The court elaborated on
this conclusion:
While the alligator cracking may have constituted property
damage, we find that no "occurrence" took place as defined by the
CGL contract. According to the deposition testimony, the only
"occurrences" were various negligent acts by the Contractor
during road design, preparation, and construction that led to the
premature deterioration of the roads .... We find that all of these
contributing factors are examples of faulty workmanship causing
damage to the roadway system only, which does not fall within
the contractual definition of "occurrence" under Bituminous's
CGL policy.'8
The court reasoned that a contractor would perhaps be able to recover if his
faulty workmanship resulted in personal injury or property damage to another.' 9
Nevertheless, the court opined that if the only loss the developer suffered is to the
property or product itself, then that loss would fall under the category of an
economic loss and which the contractor must bear as part of the business risk it
assumed in taking the job.2" The court summarized its argument by emphasizing
the roadway damage in this case was the result of faulty workmanship alone, could
not constitute an accident, and ultimately did not rise to the meaning of an
occurrence as intended by the CGL policy.2'
The next two issues the court agreed to review on certiorari required the court
to construe the meaning of the CGL policy language by resolving two questions:
(1) Did the Contractor expect or intend deterioration of the roadway? and (2) Did
the "your work" exclusion become inapplicable because a subcontractor performed
the work to the roadway?' The court refused to address whether the Contractor
expected or intended the damage to the roadways, because in determining that the
damage to the road did not constitute an "occurrence," the court eliminated the need
to analyze this issue.'
16. Bituminous, 2004 S.C. LEXIS 190, at *5-6.
17. Id. at *5.
18. Id. at *6-7.
19. Id. at *9.
20. L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 25854,2004 S.C. LEXIS 190, at *9 (S.C.
Aug. 9, 2004).
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Although finding no occurrence also rendered moot the question of whether the
damage fell within the "your work" exclusion, the court decided to address this
issue in order to clarify the court of appeals' holding that "an exception to an
exclusion 'restores' coverage."24 In trying to reverse and clarify this issue,
however, the court only muddied the waters. The supreme court agreed with the
court of appeals that the subcontractor exception found in the policy rendered the
"your work" exclusion inapplicable, but it held that "[i]n stating that the exception
to the exclusion 'restores' coverage, the court of appeals overlook[ed] existing law,
which states that 'an exclusion does not provide coverage but limits coverage.'""
On its face the court's holding appears sound and logical. In rendering this
decision, however, the court left many important questions unanswered and perhaps
created more confusion than clarification.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILrrY POLICIES
One of the main arguments that the respondent Home Indemnity Company
presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court in the petition for rehearing
involved the supreme court's failure to consider the changes in commercial general
liability policies over the past few decades and how these changes should have
affected the court's decision.' Commercial general liability policies "frequently
utilize a form drafted and revised from time to time by the Insurance Services
Office ('ISO')," and the ISO revised this form in 1966, 1973, 1986, and 1993.27
The 1986 revisions are the applicable revisions in Bituminous, though the court
seemed to base its decision on the 1973 form. In Bituminous, the court heavily
relied upon an earlier decision, C.D. Walters Construction Co. v. Fireman's
Insurance Co. ,28 which held an insurer was not responsible to defend an insured for
damage arising out of the insured's own faulty workmanship.29 CD. Walters
Construction dates back to 1984, though, and the court did not take into account the
policy changes effective in 1986.30
Numerous scholarly articles and treatises stress the importance of
understanding the 1986 commercial general liability policy changes in order to
determine accurately coverage of faulty workmanship claims under these policies."
24. Id.
25. Id. at *12-13 (quoting Engineered Prods., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 295 S.C. 375,
378-79, 368 S.E.2d 674, 675-76 (Ct. App. 1998)).
26. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing and Request for Oral Argument at 2, L-J, Inc. v.
Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 25854, 2004 S.C. LEXIS 190 (S.C. Aug. 9, 2004) (No.
200224509).
27. Lee H. Ogburn, The "Work" and "Products" Exclusions and the "'Professional Liability"
Exclusion, in INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR DEFECTIVE CONSTRUCTION, TORT AND INSURANCE PRACTICE
SECTION 475, 477 (1997).
28. 281 S.C. 593, 316 S.E.2d 709 (Ct. App. 1984).
29. See L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 25854, 2004 S.C. LEXIS 190 (S.C.
Aug. 9, 2004) (citing C.D. Walters, 281 S.C. at 598, 316 S.E.2d at 712).
30. See Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, supra note 26, at 2.
31. See 4 PHILLIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O'CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O'CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW §11:28; William D. Lyman, Is Defective Construction Covered Under
Contractors' and Subcontractors' Commercial General Liability Insurance Policies?, in HANDLING
[Vol. 56: 791
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Examining the history and reasons for these policy revisions should be the most
critical step in discerning the meaning behind the policies and how courts should
use the policies to interpret issues like those found in Bituminous. Current CGL
policies include certain exclusions that apply specifically to construction defects.a2
These exclusions have been "narrowed over the past thirty years to broaden
coverage, and by general agreement the newer policy does not eliminate coverage
for all property damage related to construction defects ... demonstrat[ing] that
the.., policy anticipates the 'occurrence' of construction defects and covers some
resulting property damage." 3
The basis of coverage in the construction context began with the standard CGL
policy form of 1973.' This policy contained a form exclusion, known as the
"business risk exclusion[]," for damage to "work" and "products." The business
risk exclusion excluded coverage for the following:
(n) property damage to the named insured'sproducts arising out
of such products or any part of such products; [and]
(o) property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the
named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof; or
out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection
therewith.35
Most courts interpreted this policy as excluding most types of damage discovered
from construction projects.3 6
Because the exclusion in the 1973 policy severely limited recovery for damages
arising from construction, beginning in 1976, insurers offered insureds the chance
to broaden their coverage through an endorsement known as the "Broad Form
Property Damage Endorsement" (BFPD). 7  By paying a higher premium,
contractors could gain more coverage under this endorsement, because it replaced
exclusion (o) of the 1973 form with three other exclusions containing a more
limited scope. The new exclusions made coverage inapplicable to the following
"particular part[s]" of the damaged property:
(p) To that particular part of any property...
CONSTRUCTION RISKS 2003, at 505 (PLI Real Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No.-
OOBY, 2003); Robert 1. Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims Under
Commercial General Liability Policies, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 785, 786 (1995); James Duffy O'Connor,
What Every Construction Lawyer Should Know About CGL Coverage for Defective Construction,
CONSTRUCTION LAWYER, Winter 2001, at 15; Clifford J. Shapiro, Inadvertent Construction Defects Are
an "Occurrence" Under CGL Policies, CONSTRUCrION LAWYER, Spring 2002, at 13.
32. Shapiro, supra note 31, at 13.
33. Id
34. Id.
35. Id. at 13-14.
36. Id at 14.
37. Id
38. Shapiro, supra note 31, at 14.
2005]
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(i) upon which operations are being performed by or on
behalf of the named insured at the time of the property
damage arising out of such operations; or
(ii) out of which any property damage arises, or,
(iii) the restoration, repair or replacement of which has been
made or is necessary by reason offaulty workmanship
thereon by or on behalf of the insured.39
Insurers and policyholders could never agree as to the meaning of the faulty
workmanship language found in exclusion (iii).' This lack of consensus seems to
be at the center of the debate with 2004 CGL policies. Litigation arose as to the
meaning of "that particular part" as well as to whether or not the faulty
workmanship exclusion applied only to work in progress or to claims arising from
work already completed.' In terms of completed operations, the deletion of
provision (o) of the 1973 form resulted in the addition of "language designed to
broaden coverage for property damage caused by the work of subcontractors." '42 By
deleting the phrase "on behalf of the named insured" found in provision (o), "the
BFPD for the first time expressly differentiated coverage based on whether the
property damage occurred before or after operations were complete. '43 Contractors
who failed to purchase the BFPD, however, still had limited coverage, as the policy
without the BFPD "specifically excluded coverage for completed operations."
By 1986, trends in the industry and various market forces directed narrowing
exclusions in favor of broader coverage and the requirement that standard CGL
policies should include coverage for completed operations.4' The revisions made
to the 1986 policy are crucial to determining coverage for faulty workmanship
claims." "[T]he 1986 policy makes clear that the 'work' exclusion for property
damage to completed operations does not apply where the property damage is [sic]
to or arises out of the work of subcontractors."47 The revised policy specifically
states, "'This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of
which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor. '"' By
adding this exception to CGL policies, insurers must have intended for the damage
due to faulty workmanship of a subcontractor to constitute an occurrence for which






44. Franco, supra note 31, at 805.
45. Id.; see Shapiro, supra note 31, at 14.
46. See Limbach Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins., 396 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2005). This case examines a CGL
Policy taking into account the 1986 policy revisions. The court held "the 'your work' exclusion does
not preclude coverage for the cost of repairing the damaged [work]. To hold otherwise would be to
ignore the unambiguous terms of the exclusion's exception for work performed by a subcontractor."
Id. at 365.
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cover faulty workmanship, undoubtedly they would not have made these policy
revisions. Still, many jurisdictions disagree as to the interpretation of these policy
revisions: "[No consensus among lawyers or courts as [to] what is intended to be
covered by CGL policies" exists."
IV. ANALYZING THE POLICY: COMPARING THE APPROACHES OF THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
Perhaps the South Carolina courts would have arrived at the same decision in
Bituminous had both courts realized the key to interpreting the meaning of CGL
policies and their exclusions lies in consulting not only the history of the policy
forms, but also the policy language itself.5'
A. The Court of Appeals'Decision
Arguably, the South Carolina Court of Appeals resolved the issues in
Bituminous correctly by analyzing them solely in terms of the policy language. The
court of appeals began its discussion of the issues by asserting, "'Insurance policies
are subject to the general rules of contract construction .... Court[s] must give
policy language its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning.""'2 With this in mind, the
court began its resolution of the arguments against coverage presented by
Bituminous:
We thus look to the language of the policy to determine
whether the deterioration and failure of the roads from repeated
water runoff is an "occurrence." The policy provides coverage
for property damage caused by an "occurrence" and defines
"property damage" as... [p]hysical injury to tangible property,
including all resulting loss of use of that property .... There is
no coverage for property damage that is "expected or intended
from the standpoint of the insured." The policy defines
"occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions."
In this case, it is undisputed that repeated exposure to surface
water runoff caused the pavement to fail. The pavement is
tangible property. The policy provides coverage for continuous
and repeated exposure to harmful conditions causing damage to
tangible property. Under the clear language of the policy, the
repeated exposure to water is an "accident" and therefore an
"occurrence." 53
50. Lyman, supra note 31, at 519.
51. O'Connor, supra note 31, at 15.
52. L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 350 S.C. 549, 554, 567 S.E.2d 489, 492 (Ct-
App. 2002) (quoting Century Indem. Co. v. Golden Hills Builders, 348 S.C. 559, 565, 561 S.E.2d 355,
358 (2002)).
53. Id. at 554-55, 567 S.E.2d at 492.
2005]
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By analyzing the policy language, the court of appeals found not only that the
damage to the roadway was an "occurrence," but also that in light of the business
risk doctrine, the subcontractor's exception to the exclusion covered the damage.'
In rebutting Bituminous's argument that faulty workmanship alone cannot rise to
the level of an occurrence, the court agreed that faulty workmanship alone was not
an occurrence but found that if the workmanship caused an accident, it would be
an occurrence."5 The court of appeals found the property damage in this situation
was the failure of the road surfaces.5 6
The court reinforced its determination of coverage by again looking at the
policy language:
Resuming our examination of the policy, we come to
exclusion (). This exclusion bars coverage for "Property damage"
to "your work" arising out of it or any part of it and included in
the "products-completed operations hazard."(sic).
Once again an exclusion appears to bar coverage, but reading
further we see the "your work" exclusion "does not apply if the
damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises was
performed on your behalf by a subcontractor." It is undisputed in
this case that the defective work was performed by a
subcontractor. This clear and unambiguous policy language
restores coverage.57
The court of appeals recognized the historical changes to the CGL policies in
its decision and interpreted the policy in light of the 1986 revisions. The court
asserted the insurance industry, "[flor whatever reason," made the decision to make
this revision, and therefore the court could "not ignore that language when
interpreting case law decided before and after the addition. 5 8
B. The Supreme Court's Approach
Instead of analyzing the specific policy at issue in Bituminous, the supreme
court chose to render its decision based on past decisions of the South Carolina
Court of Appeals, as well as a law review article explaining the purpose of the
business risk doctrine. 9 In reaching its conclusion, "[t]he Court mistakenly failed
to consider the evolution of liability policy forms and, in particular[,] the terms of
the Bituminous policy."'
54. Id. at 555-58, 567 S.E.2d at 492-94.
55. Id. at 556, 567 S.E.2d at 493.
56. Id. at 557, 567 S.E.2d at 493.
57. Id. at 558, 567 S.E.2d at 494.
58. L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 350 S.C. 549, 558-59, 567 S.E.2d 489, 494
(Ct. App. 2002).
59. L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 25854, 2004 S.C. LEXIS 190, at *7-9
(S.C. Aug. 9, 2004).
60. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, supra note 26, at 6.
[Vol. 56:791
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In addressing the issue of whether or not faulty workmanship constituted an
occurrence under Bituminous's CGL policy, the court examined the issue in terms
of the pre-1986 policy revisions. The majority of the precedent upon which the
court relied to support its holding dated earlier than 1986.6' The court, and the
insurance industry for that matter, seemed to "hold[] up as the main obstacle to
property damage coverage caused by defective construction... not the insurance
contract itself, but a theoretical concept popularized in a law review
article.., authored two years before the insurance industry revised the CGL
form."
62
The supreme court examined the policy for its definition of an occurrence, but
without delving into the meaning of the definition, it decided that no occurrence
took place. The court justified its decision by looking at the court of appeals'
decision in C.D. Walters Construction and Roger C. Henderson's law review article
dealing with the business risk doctrine.63 Though both the case and the article make
strong points on faulty workmanship and the reasons that a CGL policy does not
cover it, neither takes into account the 1986 revisions to CGL policies or the
purpose for those revisions.
The court relied on Henderson's article for his analysis of-the business risk
doctrine and the assertion that "coverage is for tort liability for physical damages
to others and not for contractual liability of the insured for economic loss because
the product or completed work is not that for which the damaged person
bargained."" The court then asserted, "[Tjhe Contractor should not be able to
recover, under a CGL contract, for the economic loss suffered by the Developer due
to the Contractor's failure to sufficiently design, compact, and pave the roadway
system. '65 The court neglected to acknowledge that in this case, the subcontractor,
not the Contractor, failed "to sufficiently design, compact, and pave the roadway
system."
In holding "the Contractor must bear the loss as a consequence of the business
risk it assumed upon submitting its bid to construct the roadway system," the court
relied on the old version of the business risk doctrine as explained by Henderson.67
This business risk doctrine of 1971 no longer applies to work by subcontractors.
Because of the broadening of coverage under the 1986 revisions to the CGL policy,
it applies only to work a contractor performed.68 By basing its reasoning not on the
policy but on an out-of-date interpretation of the policy, the supreme court paved
61. See, e.g., C.D. Walters Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 281 S.C. 593, 316 S.E.2d 709 (Ct.
App. 1984) (denying coverage for property damage arising out of faulty workmanship); Roger C.
Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and Completed Operations-What Every
Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415 (1971) (offering an overview of insurance coverage for
products liability to lawyers who represent manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers).
62. O'Connor, supra note 31, at 15.
63. Bituminous, 2004 S.C. LEXIS 190, at *7-9 (citing C.D. Walters Constr., 281 S.C. at 597-98,
316 S.E.2d at 712; Henderson, supra note 61, at 441).
64. Id. (quoting Henderson, supra note 61, at 44 1).
65. Id. at *9.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Henderson, supra note 61, at 441).
68. See Amicus Petitioners' Petition for Rehearing at 10, L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., No. 25854, 2004 S.C. LEXIS 190 (S.C. Aug. 9, 2004) (No. 200224509).
2005]
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the way for insurance companies to avoid coverage in any situation of defective
work, even though the insurance companies themselves chose to broaden this type
of coverage through the 1986 revisions.
C. Should Public Policy or Policy Language Control?
In the case at hand, instead of ruling based on the policy language, the South
Carolina Supreme Court ruled based on public policy: Contractors should be held
liable for defective workmanship, regardless of policy language or whether or not
the work was their own or that of a subcontractor.
Several public policy reasons disallow recovery under a CGL policy for
property damage arising out of faulty workmanship.69 First, allowing recovery
would provide the double payment to the contractor.7" If the contractor recovers for
faulty workmanship after accepting payment for completing the job, the contractor
is accepting payment from the insurer for correcting a job that should have been
performed correctly in the first place.7'
The second public policy reason for disallowing recovery for faulty
workmanship arises from the feeling that allowing such recovery would provide a
disincentive for contractors to perform their jobs well."' Further, the intent of CGL
policies is not "to serve the purpose of a builder's performance bond, which shifts
the risk of poor performance away from the owner but not away from the
contractor."73 Finally, courts often feel that contractors are in the best position to
avoid such damage "by properly performing the work."'74
Though all the above policy reasons are sound, the court chose the wrong case
and the wrong grounds to assert such public policies. The CGL policy does not and
should not cover a contractor who negligently performs his duties according to the
contract. A contractor who employs a subcontractor to perform a job, however,
should not be liable if the subcontractor's work affects the job as a whole. CGL
policies intend to cover this type of situation, and the ISO revised policy forms
in 1986 for the very purpose of making certain this would be covered.75
Examining this public policy reasoning in light of Bituminous makes apparent
that the reasons behind these public policies are not at issue in this case. For
instance, the first reason for disallowing recovery was the fact that a contractor
should not receive payment from an owner and then payment from the insurer,
because this would amount to a double recovery.7 6 Here, the Contractor did not
receive double recovery. He paid part of the money received from the Developer
69. See JOHN G. CAMERON, JR., A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO CONSTRUCTION LAW § 2.03(c)
(ALI-ABA Comm. on Continuing Prof'l Educ. ed., 2000); Nina Reid Mack & Francis M. Mack,
Construction Claims Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 40 S.C. L. REv. 1003,
1004-08 (1989).
70. CAMERON, supra note 69, § 2.03(c) (citing LaMarche v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 390 So. 2d 325,
326-27 (Fla. 1980)).
71. Mack & Mack, supra note 69, at 1005.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. CAMERON, supra note 69, §2.03(c) (citing LaMarche, 390 So. 2d at 326-27).
75. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 56:791
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to the subcontractor. Thus, when the roadway was damaged, had it not been for the
other insurance policies contributing to the settlement, the Contractor likely would
have had to spend money out of his own pocket to repair the damage (assuming he
did not seek indemnification from the subcontractor).
Next, the Contractor did not perform the work that was defective, so allowing
him to recover under the insurance policy would not have provided an incentive for
him to continue to perform in a faulty manner." Instead, recovery probably would
have encouraged him to hire subcontractors more cautiously. Finally, as the court
of appeals expressed in Bituminous, although allowing recovery in this case may
make the policy more like a performance bond, the policy language and the changes
to policy forms make it clear that the court has "not made the policy closer to a
performance bond for general contractors, the insurance industry has. 78
The court of appeals, by referring to the actual CGL policy, asserted a tried and
true policy of its own: looking to the language of the policy is the best way to
determine coverage. Construction lawyers and contractors should follow suit and
continue to use the policy language as the "not-so-secret-weapon" to overcome the
insurers' attempt to avoid providing coverage.79 The proof is in the policy, and if
courts begin examining construction defect cases in light of the policy language,
more just and uniform decisions will result.'0
IV. CONCLUSION
The effects of Bituminous will be long-lasting and detrimental to the
construction industry and to the construction law field. If the supreme court is
starting down a path of ignoring the policy language in determining coverage, this
course will magnify coverage questions. Not only will litigation over these issues
continue to increase, but contractors also will face increased risks, and they will be
left "without the benefit of the coverage that they purchased."' 1 At the extreme, the
decision in this case might hurt the industry by forcing contractors to seek relief in
the bankruptcy courts if they cannot afford to cover the costs their insurance plans
should have covered. At the least, insurance companies will begin a trend of
refusing to provide coverage for defective work, regardless of the circumstances.
As soon as the supreme court released this opinion, construction lawyers all over
South Carolina began receiving calls from insurance companies as these companies
began declining settlement offers, canceling scheduled arbitrations, and refusing to
provide coverage under existing policies.
On top of the effects on the construction industry and construction lawyers, this
decision will likely leave innocent property owners and home owners to absorb the
costs of property damage that defective construction causes.8 2 If insurance
companies refuse to provide coverage for such damage, who will? Contractors
77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
78. L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 350 S.C. 549, 559, 567 S.E.2d 489,494 (Ct.
App. 2002).
79. O'Connor, supra note 31, at 20.
80. Id.
81. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, supra note 26, at 1.
82. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, supra note 26, at 1-2.
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likely do not have the reserve funds to cover the high costs of damage that usually
arise in these cases. Property owners will be the ultimate victims of this decision,
"which is repugnant to the South Carolina policy of protecting the new home
buyer" and property owners."
As this Note illustrates, determinations of coverage in construction defect cases
courts should base solely on the language of the policy and in consideration of the
reasons behind the CGL policy changes in 1986." By failing to construe the policy
language as it was intended, the South Carolina Supreme Court opened the door to
continued litigation of construction defect claims, provided insurance companies
a way to refuse coverage (despite their own attempts to extend coverage by
narrowing exclusions in the policy language), and forced contractors and potentially
innocent property owners to bear the risk of loss if subcontractors perform their
work negligently. In one sweep of its pen, the supreme court brushed all arguments
for coverage for defects under the rug and virtually voided the importance of policy
language in determining coverage in commercial general liability cases.8"
Anne Marie McNeil
83. Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 341, 384 S.E.2d 730, 734 (1989).
84. See supra note 46.
85. During the pendency of this Notes' publication, the South Carolina Supreme Court granted
a petition for rehearing in L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
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